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Abstract This paper analyzes the impact of weak contracting institutions on economic
development and the wealth distribution in a Ramsey-type growth model. We show that, at
low levels of accumulation, weak contracting institutions strongly favor the economic elite:
By preventing market entry, such institutions provide the “oligarchs” with cheap access to
credit—which is highly beneficial as long as capital is scarce. At the same time, a broad cross-
section of society faces only low returns so that capital accumulation is slowed down and
the capital stock gets concentrated in the hands of the elite. At higher levels of development,
however, weak contracting institutions are harmful to all segments of society and institutional
reform becomes unanimously supported. So the model helps to explain the pervasiveness of
weak contracting institutions in less-advanced economies.
Keywords Contract enforcement · Wealth distribution · Economic development ·
Oligarchy
JEL Classification O11 · O43 · D31
1 Introduction
Many societies feature a significant divide in economic opportunities. Poor nations in par-
ticular tend to implement institutional arrangements which protect the established producers
(i.e., the economic elite) from potential outside competitors. Such barriers to entry frequently
The author thanks Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit Banerjee, Giuseppe Bertola, Johannes Binswanger, Josef
Falkinger, Ernst Fehr, Reto Föllmi, Oded Galor, Anke Gerber, Dirk Krueger, Torsten Persson, Klaus Reiner
Schenk-Hoppé, Guido Tabellini, Harald Uhlig, Fabrizio Zilibotti, Josef Zweimüller, and seminar participants
at Boston University, Brown University, the European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society in
Instanbul, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the German Macro Workshop in Würzburg, M.I.T., the
University of Leicester, and the University of Zurich for helpful comments.
M. Oechslin (B)
Department of Economics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
123
314 J Econ Growth (2009) 14:313–344
involve different but complementary elements: there is typically a “bad” contractual envi-
ronment which renders access to the banking system difficult without sufficient collateral
or long-standing business relations. At the same time, however, costly regulations of entry
make access to credit crucial—and hence complicate market entry even further.
The pervasiveness of such economic institutions is widely recognized and there is now a
growing consensus that they hamper economic performance.1 However, quite surprisingly,
we know only little about their implications in standard models of economic growth. This
paper contributes to the existing knowledge by introducing weak contract enforcement and
prohibitive regulation of entry into a tractable Ramsey-type growth model where individ-
uals make forward-looking savings and investment decisions and where the factor prices
are endogenously determined. The purpose is to address two related sets of issues: first, we
assess how this institutional environment (which we will call elite-protecting) affects long-
run economic development, the dynamics of the wealth distribution, and the welfare of the
different groups in society. Second, adopting a political-economy perspective, we look at the
dynamics of the institutional environment as the economy develops over time.
We find the implications of elite-protecting institutions to vary largely with the level of
economic development. At low levels of accumulation, such institutions lift the profits of
the elite-run firms but, at the same time, depress the returns to accumulation for a broad
cross-section of society. As a result, capital accumulation is slowed down and the dynamics
of the wealth distribution are altered strongly in favor of the elite. Yet, at more advanced
levels, the elite-protecting environment tends to become a burden for all segments of society
so that, at a certain point, even the elite may support institutional reform. Thus, provided that
the established producers hold political power, the model predicts less-advanced economies
to adopt elite-protecting institutions—which, in turn, prevent the economy from advancing
fast. On the other hand, consistent with the empirical picture, advanced economies tend to
adopt strong contracting institutions (and to cut back on other entry barriers).
To see the driving force behind these results, consider the following society. There are two
groups of individuals, the workers and the oligarchs (who constitute the elite).2 The workers
are barred from entrepreneurship due to, for instance, costly licensing of new businesses. So
as far as the workers save, they have to lend to the elite in order to earn a positive return.
The credit market, however, is imperfect in the sense that the borrowers can only borrow up
to a finite amount. The credit limit emerges endogenously because credit contracts are not
well enforced. An important implication of these assumptions is that the equilibrium bor-
rowing rate may lie below the marginal product of capital: a lower borrowing rate increases
the oligarchs’ borrowing capacity and hence allows them to absorb a certain credit supply
by the workers. The latter, in turn, are prepared to lend at a low rate because of the lack of
an alternative use for their savings. Hence, there is a spread between the workers’ and the
oligarchs’ rate of return. While the workers experience a low return, the oligarchs—having
access to cheap credit—face one that is higher than the marginal product of capital.
This price-manipulation effect dampens the equalizing forces present in a similar undis-
torted (first-best) economy and strongly alters the dynamics of the distribution in favor of
the elite: with forward-looking savings decisions, low future returns reduce the workers’
incentives to save; they discount prospective labor income less and hence perceive a high
1 See Sect. 2.1 below for some empirical evidence on the institutional environment in less-developed or
emerging economies. See, for instance, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) for historical evidence on the impact
of elite-protecting institutions on economic performance. See, among others, Hall and Jones (1999) and
Acemoglu et al. (2001) for the empirical evidence.
2 It is most natural to think of the workers as middle class agents who participate in the formal economy by
supplying their skills in the labor market. They are called “workers” simply for brevity.
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“value” of the future income stream—which leads to a low propensity to save out of wages.3
The oligarchs find themselves in the opposite situation: they are induced to accumulate faster
so that capital becomes highly concentrated in the hands of a tiny group. Yet, this surge in
savings by the elite does not fully compensate for the workers’ lower propensity to save; the
net impact on aggregate savings is negative so that the pace of capital accumulation is slower.
Besides the price-manipulation effect, this slowdown effect is the second channel through
which the elite-protecting environment exerts a positive impact on the oligarchs’ lifetime
utility. While the conduciveness of the price-manipulation effect is obvious, the intuition
behind the latter is more subtle: slower accumulation by the rest of society means a slower
decline in the marginal product of capital—which must benefit the major capital owners.
However, alongside these beneficial implications, there are also possible negative con-
sequences for the elite. In particular, weak contracting institutions may limit the extent to
which the elite-run firms can purchase complementary factors of production in an interna-
tional market; as a result, the marginal productivity of capital may be depressed. Interestingly,
magnitude and direction of the net effect on the oligarchs’ welfare crucially depend on the
level of economic development: at low levels of accumulation, both the price-manipulation
effect and the slowdown effect are strong so that the positive implications tend to dominate.
However, with capital no longer “scarce” and concentrated in the hands of the elite, the
positive effects weaken so that the net effect turns negative at some point. Put differently,
the elite-protecting environment—by inducing the oligarchs to accumulate fast—influences
the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock and its distribution in a way that makes the benefits
disappear over time. This pattern is then reflected in the endogenous evolution of the institu-
tional environment under elite rule: at early stages of development, oligarchic governments
establish elite-protecting institutions while—at later stages—these regimes try to improve
contract enforcement and hence the functioning of the financial system and related markets.
Additional properties of the model are highlighted in the numerical part of the paper (which
also provides an intuition for the quantitative implications). We find, for instance, that the
rents from the price-manipulation effect and the slowdown effect are consistently higher at
lower levels of accumulation. An immediate conclusion is that (oligarchic) countries with
particularly scarce capital endowments tend to implement elite-protecting institutions even
if such institutions had a huge negative impact on productivity. Further interesting results
concern institutional persistence. The simulations suggest that the elite—just to exploit the
benefits from price-manipulation and slowdown—may preserve elite-protecting institutions
for decades even if they impose a substantial cost in terms of lower productivity.
By identifying redistributive effects that are tied to the level of development, the pres-
ent theory can accommodate recent cross-country evidence which regularly highlights the
pervasiveness of weak contract enforcement (and complementary obstacles to entrepreneur-
ship) in less-advanced economies. Moreover, the mechanisms and predictions described here
are consistent with the well-examined historical experiences of Mexico (in the 1877–1911
period) and South Korea (in the 1961–1979 period), two countries which entered the growth
process under elite rule. As we will briefly discuss further below, it appears that—in both
cases—a major tool to please the elites was to deliver institutions which provided the oli-
garchs with cheap access to capital—with consequences that are also reflected in the present
model.
This paper combines two influential lines of research. On the one hand, we build on
work by Aghion amd Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), and Matsuyama (2000, 2006) who also
3 This implication is consistent with earlier influential work on economic growth in class-divided societies
(e.g., Kuznets 1955; Kaldor 1956; Galor and Moav 2004) which regularly highlights that the poor (i.e., the
workers) tend to have lower savings rates than the capitalists.
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analyze the evolution of the distribution when financial markets are imperfect. As in these
papers, we focus on the interplay between the current wealth distribution and the (endoge-
nous) rates of return which, in turn, determine the subsequent wealth distribution, and so on.4
There are, however, significant deviations from this literature in both the present model’s set-
up and the focus of the paper. Regarding the modelling, this paper differs from earlier work
by analyzing the impact of unequal returns to accumulation in the infinite-horizon framework
where individuals take into account the whole future path of returns and wages.5 Concerning
the focus, we depart from the literature by examining the dynamics of the distribution when
economic institutions induce a clear “class structure” during certain periods of development.
On the other hand, there is an important relation to papers by Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996),
Rajan and Zingales (2003), Beck et al. (2003), Braguinsky amd Myerson (2007), Acemoglu
(2008) and Galor et al. (2009), among others; all these contributions analyze the dynamics of
economic institutions or policies in the process of development. Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996)
show how vested interests may result in policies preventing the adoption of more productive
technologies. More closely, Rajan and Zingales (2003), Beck et al. (2003) and Braguinsky
amd Myerson (2007) point out that a functioning credit market may work against the interests
of the established large industrial firms. The former two papers suggest that weak creditor
protection benefits the elite by preventing entry and hence suppressing competition in the
product markets. Braguinsky amd Myerson (2007) argue that a better protection of outside
investors increases capital inflows from abroad and hence drives up domestic wages—with
negative consequences for the oligarchs’ profits. The present paper, by contrast, highlights
that weak creditor protection leads to vast redistributive effects by providing the elite with
cheap access to credit during the process of development. Finally, Acemoglu (2008) con-
structs a model in which, as in this paper, the elite may redistribute from the workers through
the introduction of entry barriers; in Acemoglu’s paper, however, entry barriers do not keep
capital costs low but the wage rate. Similarly, in Galor et al. (2009) the landed elite may
oppose growth-promoting policies to suppress the price of labor (but, as in this paper, the
elite may change its attitude at more advanced stages of development).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. In
Sect. 3, we discuss the impact of elite-protecting institutions on the dynamics of the economy
and the welfare of the different groups in society. Section 4 endogenizes the evolution of the
institutional environment over the process of development. In Sect. 5, the numerical analysis
is presented. Section 6, finally, concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Technology and social structure
Technology and markets The economy is closed and comprises two sectors. First, there is
a capital-intensive sector which produces a homogeneous intermediate good. For simplicity,
the intermediate good is produced from capital alone. There is a large number of firms oper-
ating in this sector, and each of these firms has access to a linear technology which produces
4 Another series of enormously influential contributions includes papers by Banerjee and Newman (1991,
1993), Galor and Zeira (1993) and Mookherjee and Ray (2002); yet, unlike the work cited above, these papers
rely on exogenous rates of return. There is also a related theoretical literature (e.g., Bénabou 1996; Aghion et
al. 2005) which looks at the impact of credit market imperfections on growth.
5 Mookherjee and Ray (2003) and Banerjee and Duflo (2005) also analyze the impact of credit market frictions
in an infinite-horizon setting. There are, however, substantial differences on the technology side.
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At units of the intermediate good with one unit of capital, where t denotes time and A is
assumed to grow at an exogenous rate gA.6 Aggregate sector output, Mt , is then simply
given by
Mt = At Qt , (1)
where Qt is aggregate capital invested in t . Capital can be exchanged in a credit market which
is competitive in the sense that all agents take the borrowing rate Rt as given. However, as
described below, the possibility of ex post moral hazard will give rise to a credit market
friction.
The second sector produces a unique final good using labor and the intermediate good as
inputs. The sector also consists of a large number of firms, and each firm has access to an
identical Cobb-Douglas production function. Since both the labor market and the market for
the intermediate good are competitive, aggregate output, Yt , is given by
Yt = L1−α Mαt , (2)
where L denotes aggregate labor supply and 0 < α < 1. Final output can be used for either
consumption or investment, and the rate of transformation of final output into capital (or vice
versa) is 1. The final good is taken as the numeraire and its price is set equal to 1.
The assumptions so far imply that the wage rate, wt , and the price of the intermediate
good, pt , are given by their marginal products, and so we have
wt = (1 − α) (Mt/L)α and pt = α (Mt/L)α−1 . (3)
The borrowing rate, by contrast, may deviate from the marginal product of capital, pt At ,
because of the credit market friction.
Agents, endowments, and distortions The population size is constant over time and nor-
malized to 1. Individuals differ with respect to their initial endowments. There are two types
of agents. A large fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of the population consists of workers. Each worker is
endowed with 1/θ units of labor which are inelastically supplied in the labor market. In addi-
tion, each worker holds a non-negative amount of capital in t = 0. The remaining individuals
establish the economic elite and are referred to as oligarchs. Each member of the elite owns
a “license” to operate a firm in the capital-intensive sector and is endowed with a strictly
positive amount of capital in t = 0. There are no further restrictions on the distribution of
initial capital endowments (within or across groups), but it is natural to think that the average
worker holds a lower endowment than the average oligarch does.
The economy features two distortions which are taken as exogenous for the moment (but
are endogenized in Sect. 4 below). Together, these distortions give rise to what we will call
an elite-protecting environment. The first distortion concerns market entry. Specifically, the
workers cannot run firms in the capital-intensive sector of the economy because of prohibitive
barriers to entry. As discussed in the previous section, such barriers may take the form of
highly expensive licensing procedures, for instance.7 An immediate consequence is that the
6 In Sect. 4, we allow the institutional environment to affect the level of the path of A. For the moment,
however, it is convenient to treat productivity as completely exogenous.
7 Alternatively, we can think that entry is prevented because, e.g., the state provides protection of productive
assets only for the well-connected industrialists (as in Braguinsky amd Myerson 2007) or because regulations
directly restrict the right to own productive assets to a certain group (as discussed in Aghion et al. 1999).
Note, however, that the workers may be excluded even without these barriers if running a capital-intensive
firm requires a minimum investment. Then, since the credit market is imperfect and own wealth serves as
collateral, the relatively “poor” workers may not bring up sufficient capital in order to meet this requirement.
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Fig. 1 Contract enforcement in courts and entry regulation. Sources: Number of days to enforce a simple debt
contract in court: Djankov et al. (2005); cost as a share of per capita GDP to open a small business (and p.c.
GDP): Djankov et al. (2002). Note: In total, we observe 83 countries. Three of these 83 observations (Italy,
Poland, Slovenia) are excluded from Fig. 1 because they have been identified as outliers using the Hadi (1992)
procedure
workers have to lend their saving to the oligarchs in order to get a positive return. But here
is where the second distortion comes into play. While artificial barriers to entry over-protect
the oligarchs, the lenders are ill-protected because of an enforcement problem. As we will
explain below, the borrowers can default ex post on credit contracts at low cost. Intuitively,
we may think that it is inexpensive for the oligarchs to stop or delay enforcement procedures.
Figure 1 illustrates that such distortions can be found in a sizable number of countries.
The figure has a proxy for enforcement problems on its horizontal axis and a measure for
regulatory barriers to entry on the vertical axis.8 There are 80 observations, and countries with
a below-median GDP per capita are marked differently. Apparently, a high burden and weak
creditor protection go hand in hand—and can be found predominantly in poorer economies.
We will return to this specific pattern when we endogenize the institutional environment
further below.
Assume now that the individuals in the range [0, θ ] are workers and those in the range (θ, 1]
are the oligarchs. Then, the aggregate labor endowment, the workers’ aggregate capital stock,






kit di, respectively, where kit denotes capital owned by agent i at date t .
2.2 Credit market
Credit relations and contract enforcement There is one possible type of credit contract. Oli-
garchs can borrow from workers in an economy-wide credit market. Ruling out other credit
relations is simply for brevity since they neither would emerge in equilibrium nor would
allowing them affect the equilibrium. The credit market is competitive in the sense that all
agents take the borrowing rate Rt as given. However, the market is imperfect in the sense that
an oligarch cannot borrow any amount at this rate. The reason is an enforcement problem. In
8 The proxy for enforcement problems is the number of days required to enforce a contract of unpaid debt
worth 50% of the country’s GDP per capita. The regulatory burden is measured by the administrative cost (in
GDP per capita, in logs) to set up a small firm. The data is from Djankov et al. (2002, 2005).
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particular, oligarch i may default on the interest debt (credit ·Rt ) by incurring a cost which
is a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1] of his current gross income, pt At qit , where qit denotes the oligarch’s
capital investment.9 We will refer to λ as the degree of protection of creditors. A λ close to 0
stands for weak creditor protection because the borrowers can avoid the contractual payment
obligations at a low cost. By contrast, λ = 1 means perfect protection since the full gross
income serves as “collateral” so that it never pays to break the contract later on.
Given these assumptions, an oligarch decides period by period whether to default or not,
and he will do so whenever he can improve his period income. We further assume that the
lenders take these incentives into account and give credit only up to the point where a bor-
rower just pays back. It immediately follows that oligarch i’s maximum amount of credit is
given by λpt At qit/Rt . Thus, the oligarch’s maximum firm size (as measured by the capital
invested) can be calculated as qit = kit + λpt At qit/Rt . Solving for qit yields
qit =
1
1 − (λpt At/Rt )kit , i ∈ (θ, 1]. (4)
Equation (4) has two important properties. First, the maximum firm size is proportional to
the oligarch’s own capital stock, and the factor of proportionality is larger than 1—which
means that the oligarch’s borrowing capacity increases in kit (note that Rt > λpt At in equi-
librium). The reason is that punishment is a fraction of total output which is produced with
borrowed capital but also with the oligarch’s own capital holdings. Second, qit increases
as the borrowing rate decreases. Other things equal, lowering Rt reduces the benefit from
breaking the contract while the cost remains unchanged, and so an oligarch can borrow up
to a larger amount without being induced to break the contract ex post. Finally, notice that
default does not occur in equilibrium. It is the possibility to default which renders the credit
market imperfect.
Figure 2 shows oligarch i’s optimal firm size (i.e., his optimal gross capital demand) as a
function of Rt , given restriction (4) and the price of the intermediate good. If the borrowing
rate exceeds the marginal product of capital, he will not seek credit at all but simply run a
firm of size kit . If the borrowing rate equals the marginal product of capital, he is prepared
to employ any amount of capital in his firm while restriction (4) limits the maximum firm
size to (1 − λ)−1 kit , and so the oligarch’s gross capital demand may take any value on the
interval
[
kit , (1 − λ)−1 kit
]
. Finally, in case of Rt < pt At , the oligarch would like to get an
infinite amount of credit since he can appropriate a rent on each unit borrowed. However, the
maximum firm size is limited to qit (Eq. 4). This upper bound increases as the borrowing
rate decreases and it approaches infinity as Rt goes to λpt At .
Equilibrium borrowing rate We now turn to the aggregate level. Aggregate gross capital
supply, Kt , is given by the sum of the workers’ and the oligarchs’ aggregate capital stocks,
K Lt + K Et . Aggregate gross capital demand is obtained by adding up the optimal firm sizes
characterized above. Thus, given pt , it equals K Et if the borrowing rate exceeds the marginal
product of capital; it lies on the interval
[
K Et , (1 − λ)−1 K Et
]
if Rt is equal to the the marginal
product of capital; finally, it is given by {1 − (λpt At/Rt )}−1 K Et if the borrowing rate lies
below the marginal product of capital (see Fig. 3).
9 As in Matsuyama (2000, 2006), there are no other costs like, for instance, limited access to credit in the
future. While this assumption is made for analytical convenience, it can also be supported by arguing that there
is a large number of potential lenders which do not share information about the borrowers’ credit histories.
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Fig. 2 Oligarch i’s optimal firm size
(a) (b)
Fig. 3 Credit market equilibrium
The equilibrium borrowing rate has to equate gross capital demand and supply. As a result,




≡ κt , (5)
gross capital demand would fall short of gross capital supply, Kt , if the borrowing rate were
equal to the marginal product of capital (see Fig. 3b). Hence, Rt has to be lower than pt At
in order to give the borrowers weaker incentives to default. More precisely, we must have
Rt = λpt At/κt so that K Lt is exactly absorbed by the oligarchs. To summarize, we have
r L (Kt/Bt , κt ) = Rt =
{ λ
κt
pt At = λκt α (Kt/Bt )α−1




κt ≤ λ , (6)
where r L denotes the workers’ return to capital. To derive the last two equalities in Eq. (6)
we substitute for pt and account for the fact that the whole capital stock will be employed
123
J Econ Growth (2009) 14:313–344 321
(Qt = Kt ).10 Moreover, we use the definition Bt ≡ Aα/(1−α)t to facilitate the exposition of
the economy’s intertemporal behavior (whereas g will denote the growth rate of B).
The fact that the workers may face a return below the marginal product of capital is a result
of the elite-protecting environment. Since the elite is shielded from entry, the workers have
to lend in order to earn a positive return. But since creditors are insufficiently protected from
opportunistic behavior by the borrowers, they may be forced to charge low borrowing rates:
lower rates mean softer incentives to default so that the full credit supply can be allocated
incentive-compatibly. As reflected in condition (5), the rate is more likely to be suppressed if
either credit supply is relatively large or if the cost of opportunistic behavior is low. Clearly,
these implications require that those who lack domestic business opportunities cannot too
easily make (high-return) investments abroad. But since this constraint only applies to the
“poor” workers, it seems not to be a particularly restrictive one.
Oligarchs’ rate of return We now calculate the oligarchs’ rate of return, r Et . Suppose first
that κt > λ so that Rt lies below the marginal product of capital. Then, each oligarch seeks
the maximum amount of credit and hence runs a firm of size qit . In general, an oligarch’s
income is given by the firm revenue minus the interest debt so that, if κt > λ, oligarch i
earns pt At qit − (qit − kit )Rt . Then, substituting for qit and Rt (Eqs. 4, 6) yields
Oligarch i’s income = (1 − λ)
(1 − κt ) pt At kit , κt > λ.
To calculate the rate of return, we have to divide the oligarch’s income by his capital stock,
kit , and so we get r Et = (1 − λ)pt At/(1 − κt ). Finally, note that—if κt ≤ λ—the rate of
return equals exactly the marginal product of capital. To summarize, we have
r E (Kt/Bt , κt ) =
{ 1−λ
1−κt pt At = 1−λ1−κt α (Kt/Bt )α−1




κt ≤ λ . (7)
Equations (6) and (7) highlight that there is a spread in the rates of return if κt > λ. In
this case, the workers face a return below the marginal product while the oligarchs face one
above since the additional income from each unit borrowed is larger than the rental rate. So,
in contrast to the standard neoclassical model, the individual returns here do not only depend
on the level of the aggregate capital stock but also on its distribution.
2.3 Optimal consumption and aggregate dynamics
This subsection analyzes the intertemporal decisions and derives the equations governing
aggregate dynamics. To this end, we introduce the following definitions. We write r Lt ≡
r L (Kt/Bt , κt ) and r Et ≡ r E (Kt/Bt , κt ) if convenient. Moreover, a (̂) over a variable
denotes the variable divided by B, the transformed index of the state of technology. For
example, we use the definition K̂t ≡ Kt/Bt and call K̂ the aggregate capital stock in effi-
ciency units.
Optimal individual consumption All individuals derive utility from consumption of the final
good. They divide their income in each period (as measured in units of the final good) into
consumption and savings in a way that maximizes the intertemporal utility function
10 The equilibrium without an intermediate goods sector (i.e., if the final good were directly produced from K
and L) would be equivalent if punishment in case of default were a fraction λ of firm revenues minus wages.
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where ρ and cit denote, respectively, the rate of time preference and individual i’s consump-
tion at date t . Today’s savings contribute one-to-one to the capital stock of tomorrow so
that
kit+1 = (1 + rit )kit + liwt − cit , (9)
where rit = r Lt , li = 1θ if i ∈ [0, θ ] and rit = r Et , li = 0 otherwise. Individuals are for-
ward-looking and can perfectly forecast the future values of the two state variables, K̂t and
κt , and also those of the rates of return, r Lt and r Et , and the wage rate, wt = (1 − α)Bt K̂ αt .
Then, optimal behavior implies that consumption evolves according to the Euler equation,
cit+1 = 1 + rit+11 + ρ cit , (10)





m=1 (1 + rit+m)
= 0.
Further, by using the Euler equation in the intertemporal budget constraint, we get
cit = ρ1 + ρ ((1 + rit ) kit + hit ) , (11)
where hit = ∑∞j=0
{
(1 + rit )wt+ j li/∏ jm=0 (1 + rit+m)
}
denotes agent i’s present value of
labor income.11 Substituting for cit in Eq. (9) results in
kit+1 = 1 + rit1 + ρ kit +
(
wt li − ρ1 + ρ hit
)
. (12)
Note that for i ∈ (θ, 1] we have li = 0 and hence hit = 0. Accordingly, as a result of the
log-preferences, the oligarchs’ optimal consumption behavior depends only on the current
state of the economy and is independent of the future evolution of Kt and κt .
Aggregate dynamics Since the returns to accumulation are identical within groups, indi-
vidual behavior aggregates nicely. Summing up the individual consumption levels (Eq. 11)
and standardizing yields aggregate consumption (in efficiency units),
Ĉt = ρ1 + ρ
((





whereas the present value of the aggregate labor income (also in efficiency units) is given by
Ĥt = ŵt + (1 + g)ŵt+1(1 + r Lt+1
) + (1 + g)
2ŵt+2(
1 + r Lt+1
) (
1 + r Lt+2
) + · · ·, (14)
and g denotes the growth rate of the transformed productivity paramter B. Later on, it will
be helpful to know the law of motion of Ĥt . Manipulating Eq. (14) yields




1 + r Lt+1
)
. (15)
11 Since the workers cannot borrow, it is implicitly assumed that they can follow this consumption rule without
violating the (kit ≥ 0) -constraint. This is indeed the outcome of all the simulations we have performed.
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Note that the distortions can affect aggregate consumption only via the future rates of
return, r Lt+1, r Lt+2, . . ., which, in turn, affect the present value of labor income (but—due to
the linearity of the consumption function—not via redistributing current capital income).
Aggregating Eq. (9) across individuals and using the expression for aggregate consump-
tion (Eq. 13) allows us to derive the law of motion of K̂ as
K̂t+1(1 + g) = 11 + ρ K̂t +
1 + ρ(1 − α)




1 + ρ Ĥt . (16)
For further use below, we rewrite this equation slightly. Solving Eq. ( 15) for Ĥt and using
the resulting expression in Eq. (16) yields
K̂t+1(1 + g) = 11 + ρ K̂t +
1






1 + r Lt+1
. (16′)
Two remaining issues need to be discussed at this point. First, our exposition shows that
with λ = 1 the economy here is formally equivalent to the textbook Ramsey–Cass–Koop-
mans model. The introduction of a protected intermediate goods sector, if not accompanied
by imperfect enforcement, has no impact on aggregate dynamics. Second, we do not have
a generic proof of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium if λ < 1. However, a
large number of simulations (see Sect. 5) have not led to any signs of non-existence or
multiplicity.
3 Comparative dynamics and the steady state
This section compares the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock and its distribution in
an elite-protecting economy to that in the corresponding first-best economy. The first-best
economy features perfect contract enforcement and no entry barriers but is otherwise an
identical copy of the former one, also with respect to the initial values of K̂ and κ. Through-
out the analysis, it is assumed that K̂0 lies below its first-best balanced-growth level so
that the first-best economy converges to the corresponding steady-state values K̂ ∗f b and
κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0). This notation makes transparent that, in the first-best world, the steady-state
distribution of capital (but not the level of the capital stock) depends on the initial condi-
tions.12
We start the analysis by looking at the dynamics of the distribution in the first-best econ-
omy (Sect. 3.1). We then derive the comparative-dynamic results as well as the welfare
implications (Sect. 3.2) and finally focus on convergence (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 Behavior of the first-best economy
To derive the behavior of κ in case of the first-best economy, it is convenient to calculate the
steady-state values of K̂ and r first. These values are given by, respectively,
K̂ ∗f b =
(
α
ρ + g + ρg
) 1
1−α
and 1 + r∗f b = (1 + ρ)(1 + g).
12 See, e.g., Chatterjee (1994) or Bertola et al. (2006, Chap. 2).
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Moreover, the present value of labor income (in efficiency units) equals (1 + ρ)ρ−1ŵ∗f b
so that Ht and (1 + r∗f b)Kt (as well as output and consumption) grow at the same rate,
g, in steady state—which is consistent with the fact that κ is a constant on the balanced
growth path. The lemma below relates this constant to κ0. Note, however, that—although the
economy converges to a particular value of κ—any level can be supported in steady state.
Lemma 1 In the first-best economy, the workers’ share in aggregate capital, κ , converges
from below towards its steady-state level, κ∗f b. Formally, we have κt < κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) for all
t ≥ 0.
Proof See “Appendix”. 	unionsq
Lemma 1 highlights that, in the first-best economy, the workers have a relatively high
propensity to save at early stages of development. As a result, if the initial capital stock is
predominantly owned by the elite, the distribution grows more equal over time. The reason
is the intertemporal behavior of hit , the present value of labor income: it turns out that, at
low levels of accumulation, hit is relatively low so that consumption induced by this wealth
component, (ρ/(1 + ρ))hit , is also small. So, intuitively, the workers save a large part of
their current labor income, liwt , while their propensity to save out of capital income equals
that of the oligarchs. As a result, the workers accumulate faster.13 Yet, the difference in the
speed of accumulation decreases over time because hit rises faster than the wages do.
It is further interesting to discuss Lemma 1 in the light of an earlier influential literature on
economic growth in class-divided societies. For instance, contributions by Kuznets (1955)
or Kaldor (1956) highlight that the wage earners tend to have a lower propensity to save
than the capitalists. Clearly, Lemma 1 is inconsistent with these observations. Yet, Lemma
1 only applies in a benchmark case where the workers and the oligarchs have exactly the
same opportunities to earn high returns on their wealth. It is the central topic of the following
analysis to show that, consistent with the earlier literature, the workers’ propensity to save is
only low in the more realistic case of unequal access to economic opportunities.
3.2 Comparative dynamics and welfare
Comparative dynamics A direct implication of Lemma 1 is that the distortions have no
impact if λ is relatively high: if λ exceeds κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) and the workers stick to their first-best
consumption level in t = 0, κ can grow towards κ∗f b without inducing a spread in the rates of
return in the future (see Fig. 4, “high” λ). So the workers do not deviate from their first-best
behavior at any point in time (and neither do the oligarchs)—which means that the dynamics
towards the steady state are similar to that in the first-best economy.
In what follows, we focus on an economy with relatively weak creditor protection so that
κ∗f b > λ (see Fig. 4, “low” λ). Then, elite-protecting institutions can be shown to have an
impact on how the economy evolves. The starting point is to establish that aggregate con-
sumption will be higher (relative to the first-best economy) at early stages of development:
Lemma 2 Let κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) > λ. Then, Ĉ0 is strictly higher in the elite-protecting economy
than in the first-best economy. Hence, K̂1 must be smaller as compared to the first-best case.
Proof See “Appendix”. 	unionsq
13 By looking at the growth rate of the individual capital stocks, (kit+1 − kit )/kit = (rt − ρ)/(1 + ρ) +
(li wt − (ρ/(1 + ρ))hit ) /kit , we see that this result is not confined to our specific distribution of labor endow-
ments. It would also hold if, e.g., labor were equally distributed (i.e., with l and h identical across agents).
The result would be mitigated, however, if the oligarchs were also the largest wage earners.
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Fig. 4 Two cases
Lemma 2 shows that the elite-protecting environment is reflected in lower savings out
of the aggregate income in t = 0. The intuition is that low future returns to accumulation
weaken the workers’ incentives to save. More specifically, the elite-protecting environment




3 , . . . , in a way that increases the present value of the
labor income in t = 0. Thus, the workers consume a larger part of their initial labor income
(while the propensities to consume out of capital income are unchanged).
The next step is now to focus on the pace of capital accumulation in a longer perspective:
Proposition 1 Let κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) > λ. Then, K̂t is strictly lower in the elite-protecting econ-
omy than in the first-best economy for all t > 0. Hence, we have K̂t < K̂ ∗f b for all t ≥ 0.
Proof See “Appendix”. 	unionsq
An immediate implication of Proposition 1 is that the workers’ share in aggregate capital
is strictly lower in the elite-protecting economy from t = 1 onwards: from Proposition 1 and
Eq. (7), it follows directly that, with elite-protecting institutions, r Et is strictly higher at all
future dates t > 0 no matter whether there is a spread in the rate of return (κt > λ) or not
(κt ≤ λ). Moreover, r E0 is equal or higher in the elite-protecting environment. Consequently,
the oligarchs’ aggregate capital stock, K E , is equal or higher in t = 1 and strictly higher (as
compared to the first-best benchmark) at any date t > 1 (Eq. 12). Since K Et /Kt = (1 − κt )
and by Proposition 1, our claim follows. To summarize (proof in the text),
Proposition 2 Let κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) > λ. Then, κt is strictly lower in the elite-protecting economy
than in the first-best economy for all t > 0.
So, by reducing the workers’ propensity to save, the elite-protecting environment weakens
the dynamics towards more equity in currently unequal societies. Thus, it is interesting to
ask whether the workers’ savings are still sufficiently large to push κ beyond λ if κ0 < λ:
Proposition 3 Let κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) > λ ≥ κ0. Then, κ rises above the threshold level λ at some
point in time. More generally, whenever κ lies below λ, it must (again) be strictly higher in
some future period (and thus we also have κ∗f b(K̂t , κt ) > λ for all t > 0).
Proof See “Appendix”. 	unionsq
Proposition 3 can be understood as follows. According to Lemma 2, the present value
of the aggregate labor income, Ĥ0, must be higher in the elite-protecting economy while
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Proposition 1 implies that, at any point in time, the wages (the marginal product of capital)
are comparatively low (high) so that Ĥ0 tends to be low. Proposition 3 states now that a slower
accumulation and a higher present value of labor income can only go together when some
time later the workers discount future labor income with less than the marginal product of
capital. So there must be at least one period in which the workers’ share in aggregate capital
exceeds λ.
Proposition 3 also allows us to compare the growth rate of the elite-protecting economy
in a given period t with the rate that would prevail in a first-best economy which is at the
same state, (K̂t , κt ). Since κ∗f b(K̂t , κt ) > λ for all t > 0, Lemma 2 applies at all points on
the equilibrium path. Thus, it is always the case that the growth rate in the elite-protecting
economy is strictly lower than the rate in a first-best economy at the same state.
Welfare implications These comparative-dynamic results lead to clear-cut welfare predic-
tions: we already know that the oligarchs’ rate of return, r Et , t > 0, is strictly higher with
elite-protecting institutions. Hence, due to the Euler equation, the oligarchs must be on a
steeper consumption path (relative to first-best). Moreover, since the oligarchs’ initial con-
sumption level is equal to (in case of κ0 ≤ λ) or higher than (in case of κ0 > λ) the
benchmark level, they consume strictly more in each period t > 0—which means that their
lifetime utility (8) is higher. Note further that, since the outcome in the first-best economy is
on the utility possibility frontier, the workers must be worse off. To summarize (proof in the
text),
Proposition 4 Let κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) > λ. Then, the oligarchs are strictly better off in the elite-
protecting economy than in the first-best economy. The workers, by contrast, are worse off.
Obviously, an important force behind the oligarchs’ welfare gain is what Acemoglu (2008)
calls a price-manipulation effect: by reducing incentive-compatible demand for credit, the
elite-protecting environment puts the oligarchs in a collective monopsony position—which
allows them to borrow at a rate below the marginal product of capital.14 There is, however,
a second favorable mechanism: as shown in Proposition 1, weak creditor protection reduces
the pace of aggregate capital accumulation so that the marginal product of capital is higher
at each point in time. As a result, since the oligarchs derive income solely from capital,
they would experience higher levels of income and consumption in each period even if they
had to pay exactly the marginal product when borrowing (and the rents were appropriated
by someone else).15 Put differently, this slowdown effect benefits the oligarchs because the
factor from which they derive their income is relatively scarce at each point in time.
We now have established that weaker creditor protection lifts the oligarchs’ lifetime util-
ity relative to a situation with near-perfect enforcement (λ ≥ κ∗f b). Yet, our theoretical
analysis does not arrive at a clear-cut prediction on whether a lower λ is uniformly asso-
ciated with a higher lifetime utility. To see the reason, consider two economies which are
again identical aside from creditor protection; moreover, assume that the two values of λ
are given by λh and λl , whereas κ0 > λh > λl . Then, by looking at the borrowing rate,
Rt = (λ/κt )α K̂ α−1t , we immediately see that—in t = 0− the λl—economy experiences a
14 However, in Acemoglu (2008) paper, it is the wage rate that is manipulated. This is also true in Braguin-
sky amd Myerson (2007) who—inter alia—show how poor protection of investments by outsiders depresses
wages.
15 More formally, oligarch i’s optimal consumption-savings behavior is described by cit = (ρ/(1 + ρ))(
1 + r Et
)
kit and kit+1 = (1/(1 + ρ))
(
1 + r Et
)
kit . So, if r Et declines at a lower rate, consumption in each
period t > 0 would be higher even if r E were given by the marginal product of capital.
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Fig. 5 Dynamics of the representative oligarch’s level of consumption with different λs
stronger price-manipulation effect (i.e., we have λl/κ0 < λh/κ0) so that the oligarchs’ rate
of return,
r E (K̂t , κt ) = 1 − λ1 − κt α K̂
α−1
t ,
is unambiguously higher. Obviously, this result is due to the fact that—in a given period—
credit supply is inelastic. Yet, in a dynamic perspective, this is no longer true: as the workers
save little in response to the low rates of return, future supply of credit in the λl -economy
will be low. Put differently, the future values of the workers’ share in aggregate capital,
κ1,λl , κ2,λl , . . ., will be comparatively small. Thus, unlike in the beginning, weaker creditor
protection may be associated with a weaker price-manipulation effect later on. Note, how-
ever, that low future credit supply does not necessarily imply low future levels of r E (K̂t , κt ).
If the workers save little, the sequence of capital stocks, K̂1,λl , K̂2,λl , . . . , converges more
slowly—which implies a milder decline in the marginal product of capital (and hence in r E ).
Thus, whether the elite prefers λl over λh is a priori unclear. The question is whether
the benefits associated with a more powerful slowdown effect and a stronger initial price-
manipulation effect outweigh possible “losses” due to weaker price manipulation later on.
Answering this question requires a comparative-dynamic analysis of the transitional paths
of the two state variables which determine the dynamics of r E (K̂t , κt ) and hence the con-
sumption path. Yet, since these paths cannot be pinned down explicitly, it is convenient to
rely on simulations. Figure 5 gives a representative picture of the results. The two solid lines
show the representative oligarch’s consumption paths, with the upper graph reflecting the
λl -economy. Clearly, the figure reveals that—in each period—consumption is higher in the
λl -case. Thus, the oligarchs are strictly better off under weaker creditor protection.
The dashed lines, finally, reflect results from a slightly different experiment: each line
shows the oligarch’s consumption path after the λh-economy has experienced an unexpected
fall in λ (at three different points in time). Apparently, consumption consistently improves
in the aftermath of such a change. Thus, given this parametrization, we not only find that
the equilibrium associated with permanently low creditor protection leads to higher welfare.
Figure 5 also suggests that—on the equilibrium path of the λh-economy—lowering λ benefits
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the elite at any given point. Further simulations based on different parametrizations have not
resulted in any conflicting findings. Some of these simulations are presented in Sect. 5.
3.3 Convergence and the steady state
In order to discuss convergence under elite-protecting institutions, we first have to establish
the existence of a steady state. From above, we know that the first-best economy is on a
balanced growth path if the aggregate capital stock (in efficiency units) equals K̂ ∗f b. We
further know that the distribution of capital is constant under balanced growth. From this,
it follows that also in the elite-protecting environment any combination of state variables(
K̂ ∗f b, κ
)
, κ ∈ [0, λ], is consistent with steady-state growth: under these circumstances, we
have r L = r E = r∗f b so that the dynamics do not differ from those in the first-best economy.
In particular, κ is a constant so that imperfect creditor protection may never play a role.
We now proceed by looking at the accumulation process in the elite-protecting economy:
Lemma 3 Let κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) > λ and r L0 ≥ r∗f b. Then, we have K̂t+1 > K̂t for all t ≥ 0.
Proof See “Appendix”. 	unionsq
Lemma 3 states that the individuals’ optimal consumption decisions will never give rise
to negative aggregate savings. The intuition is the same as in the first-best economy. Negative
aggregate savings in t are associated with a higher return to capital in t + 1. Then, since the
Euler equation determines consumption growth, aggregate consumption will expand strongly
between the two periods so that aggregate savings are even lower in t +1. This, in turn, leads
to a strong expansion of consumption between t + 1 and t + 2, and so on. Eventually, the
economy would collapse if the individuals followed such a consumption path.
So far, we know that even in the elite-protecting economy the aggregate capital stock
monotonically increases (Lemma 3) but may never exceed K̂ ∗f b (Proposition 1). Suppose
now that K̂ does not converge to K̂ ∗f b but to a level that lies strictly below K̂ ∗f b. Then, by
Eq. (7), we have 1 + r Et > 1 + r∗f b = (1 + ρ)(1 + g) for all t ≥ 0. Consequently, since
K̂ Et+1 =
1 + r Et
(1 + ρ)(1 + g) K̂
E
t ,
K̂ E has to grow towards infinity. This, in turn, requires K̂ L to become negative from some
point onwards which is impossible since the workers cannot borrow.16 Hence, the aggregate
capital stock must converge to K̂ ∗f b. Then, by the Eqs. (16) and (13), we have limt→∞Ĥt =
(1 + ρ)ρ−1ŵ∗f b = Ĥ∗f b and limt→∞Ĉt = Ĉ
∗
f b, respectively. To summarize (proof in the text),
Proposition 5 Let κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) > λ and r L0 ≥ r∗f b. Then, aggregate capital, K̂ , and aggre-
gate consumption, Ĉ, converge to their corresponding first-best steady-state values, K̂ ∗f b and
Ĉ∗f b.
We now look at the limit behaviour of κt . Note that this ratio cannot converge to a value on
the interval (λ, 1] since the oligarchs’ rate of return would converge to a level that is strictly
higher than r∗f b = (1+ρ)(1+g)−1. Then, once again, the oligarchs’ stock of capital would
grow towards infinity. Note further that κt does not converge to a value on the interval [0, λ)
either because of Proposition 3. However, κt can be shown to converge exactly to λ:
16 Note, however, that even if the workers were allowed to borrow, K̂ could not converge to a value below
K̂ ∗f b. The reason is that Ĉ would grow towards infinity.
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Proposition 6 Let κ∗f b(K̂0, κ0) > λ and r L0 ≥ r∗f b. Then, the workers’ share in aggregate
capital, κ, converges to λ.
Proof See “Appendix”. 	unionsq
Propositions 5 and 6 highlight a certain asymmetry in the impact of elite-protecting insti-
tutions. While such an environment does not prevent the aggregate capital stock from con-
verging to its first-best level, it may have a large impact on the long-run distribution of
capital. These results are, however, two sides of the same coin. While weakening the work-
ers’ incentives to save, elite-protecting institutions induce the oligarchs to accumulate fast so
that—over time—the elite’s share in the aggregate capital stock becomes sufficiently large
to render the borrowing constraints insignificant. As a result, the gap between the workers’
and the oligarchs’ return to accumulation is set to vanish. But this also means that the aggre-
gate variables eventually evolve as in an undistorted economy—and thus converge to their
first-best levels.
4 Endogenous productivity and institutions
We now continue the analysis by modifying the existing framework in two natural dimensions.
First, we allow the elite-protecting environment to affect productivity. Second, adopting a
political-economy perspective, we endogenize the dynamics of the institutional environment
over the process of development.
4.1 A simple extension
Institutions and productivity The ramifications of poor contract enforcement may not be
confined to the financial system. A further important concern is that weak contracting insti-
tutions limit the access to crucial foreign input factors (such as “technology”).17 For con-
creteness, suppose that oligarch i’s output is no longer given by an exogenous parameter At
times capital invested but instead by A˜i t (zit , qit ) · qit , where zit denotes the quantity of an
additional input factor which can be bought in a perfectly competitive international market.
We will refer to this factor simply as the “technology good,” and we impose






where 0 < γ < 1. The price of the technology good is given by χ units of the intermediate
good so that the total cost reads ptχ zit when expressed in terms of the final good. Technology
contracts are subject to the same type of enforcement problems as credit contracts are. Spe-
cifically, oligarch i can default ex post on the payment obligation by incurring a cost which
is given by λ times the current firm revenue, pt A˜i t qit . As a result, incentive compatibility
requires λpt A˜i t qit ≥ ptχ zit so that default does not occur in equilibrium. Note further that,
in case of default on the credit contract, it is now convenient to assume that the punishment
is given by λ times the firm revenue net of the total cost of technology.
An oligarch’s intra-temporal decision problem now involves two choice variables, qit and
zit , and these variables are chosen to maximize the oligarch’s income, pt A˜i t qit − Rt (qit −
17 Related arguments can be found in Antràs and Helpman (2004) in the context of a Ricardian trade model.
See also Acemoglu et al. (2007) for a model in which weak contracting institutions lead to the choice of
less advanced technologies. Similarly, Erosa and Hidalgo Cabrillana (2008) demonstrate how poor (credit)
contract enforcement can lead to the inefficient use of low-productivity technologies.
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kit ) − ptχ zit , subject to the two incentive-compatibility constraints λpt ( A˜i t qit − χ zit ) ≥
Rt (qit − kit ) and λpt A˜i t qit ≥ ptχ zit . The solution to this decision problem is derived in the
appendix. It turns out that the equilibrium firm size as measured by capital invested remains
as discussed in Sect. 2.2 and shown in Fig. 2—with the exception that At is replaced by A(λ),
a constant which is pinned down by the equilibrium factor intensity as discussed below. As
a result, the equations determining r Lt and r Et retain their form as well. More generally, At
has to be replaced by A(λ) in all the existing equations but the functional forms remain unaf-
fected. Turning to factor intensity, we get that A˜i t is given by (λ/χ)γ/(1−γ ) if λ < γ and by
(γ /χ)γ/(1−γ ) otherwise, whereas the latter expression stands for the unconstrained-optimal
choice. So, in the present environment, weak contract enforcement can actually lead to a
static inefficiency by restricting the quantity of foreign inputs to a sub-optimal level.
To assess the impact of weak contract enforcement on aggregate income, we have to
determine the oligarch’s net output, i.e., output minus the cost of technology:
Oligarch i’s net output = A(λ)qit =
{
(λ/χ)γ/(1−γ ) (1 − λ)qit : λ < γ
(γ /χ)γ/(1−γ ) (1 − γ )qit : λ ≥ γ .
From this, we can immediately infer that the extended framework is formally equivalent
to the basic version with a modified aggregate production function in the capital-intensive
sector:
Mt = A(λ)Qt . (1′)
So, in contrast to the baseline world, weak contract enforcement not only retards growth by
distorting savings incentives but may also hamper economic development by depressing the
level of productivity in the capital-intensive sector of the economy.
Below, it will be convenient to directly rely on the reduced-form representation of the
technology as shown in Eq. (1′). Moreover, to simplify the exposition, we assume that all
oligarchs get the same initial capital endowment. Finally, note that—as in the previous sec-
tions—we can have exogenous “technological progress” by augmenting A˜i t with a factor
that steadily grows, and so we will sometimes write At (λ) instead of just A(λ).
Political power and institutional choices While the distortions have been treated as exog-
enous so far, we now allow for endogenous changes over time. The focus is on an oligarchy
where, in every period, economic institutions are determined by (majoritarian voting among)
the elite.18 There are two dimensions, the quality of contract enforcement and the extent
of entry barriers. Regarding the first dimension, there are two options, λt ∈ {λ, λ}, where
λ < λ. In reality, switching from weak enforcement to strong enforcement can be achieved
by, for instance, an organizational reform which gives the judges stronger incentive to decide
accurately; by hiring more judges (and paying them better); or by promoting the most able
judges into important positions. Clearly, some of these measures are costly. For the moment,
however, we abstract from this point but return to it below. We further impose λ < γ and
λ = 1 which means that, if λ is implemented, productivity in the capital-intensive sector is
impaired whereas λ is associated with first-best productivity. This parametrization guarantees
that the elite faces an interesting trade-off when deciding on enforcement. A final restriction
comes from the notion that, in practice, once powerful and reliable law-enforcement sys-
tems are created, it is difficult to turn back the clock due to the resistance of the institutions
18 Under democracy (i.e, with majoritarian voting among the whole population) the outcome would always
be “perfect contract enforcement” and “no barriers to entry” since the median voter is a worker.
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themselves.19 So we model λ as an absorptive choice, i.e., a choice that cannot be reverted
later on.
The second institutional choice pertains to the possibility of entering the capital-intensive
sector. Also in this dimension, there are two options, “entry permitted” or “entry prohib-
ited.” As discussed in Sect. 2 , the latter option can take the form of prohibitively expensive
procedures to acquire a business license (with which the oligarchs are endowed). Note that
the optimal choice in this respect is closely related to that of λ: maintaining weak contract
enforcement can only benefit the elite if the workers remain excluded, and so opting for
λt = λ also means opting for “entry prohibited.” On the other hand, if λt = λ, we are back in
the first-best world and so prohibiting entry (or allowing it) has no implications anymore. For
this reason, we no longer explicitly address entry barriers but take for granted that λt = λ is
associated with “entry prohibited” (while λt = λ may be associated with “entry permitted”).
The institutional setting is determined at the very beginning of each period t (as long as
λt−1 = λ) and becomes effective immediately. Moreover, since all elite members are iden-
tical, they prefer the same options, and so we can focus on the choice of the representative
oligarch.
Limited knowledge Finally, as long as the elite-protecting environment is in place, we find
it plausible to impose a restriction on the workers’ knowledge about the technology in the
capital-intensive sector: being excluded from this sector anyway, the workers are unaware of
the fact that switching to perfect enforcement would lift the productivity of capital. Instead, if
the oligarchs opt for elite-protecting institutions in the beginning (λ0 = λ), the workers take
as invariable the level (of the path) of A as observed in t = 0.20 As will become clear, this
assumption implies that a potential switch to perfect enforcement comes unexpectedly for
the workers (though not for the elite). Besides being a reasonable approximation to reality,
this assumption allows us to analyze institutional change in a tractable way.
4.2 Analysis and discussion
We now derive the model’s implications regarding the dynamics of the institutional environ-
ment. The following results are obtained under initial conditions similar to those in Sect. 3.
So the focus is on an economy where capital is “scarce” in the beginning. More precisely,
we impose K̂0,λ = K0/B0(λ) to lie below the (first-best) steady-state level, whereas again
Bt (λ) ≡ At (λ)α/(1−α). Moreover, we continue to assume that λ is sufficiently small so that it
affects the workers’ consumption-savings behavior (i.e., we still impose λ < κ∗f b(K̂0,λ, κ0)).
Institutional change The first step is to determine how the oligarchs’ attitude towards elite-
protecting institutions changes over time. Suppose that the elite has chosen λ0 = λ so that
there is room for improvement later on. Clearly, a possible future switch to perfect enforce-
ment must come unexpectedly for the workers: if improving enforcement did not enhance
productivity, it would be in the oligarchs’ interest to preserve the elite-protecting environment
19 This is not to argue that reversals are impossible. Nevertheless, once a large number of high-quality judges
are promoted to tenured positions and powerful supervisory bodies are installed, it would certainly require
costly fights (which might even threaten the rule of the elite) to return to the old system.




even after a switch to λ due to
the lack of information about the elite’s access to the foreign good. The oligarchs rely indeed on this intensity
as long as λt = λ but choose (γ /χ)γ /(1−γ ) after a switch to λ (which is then observed by the workers).
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at each point on the equilibrium path associated with λ0 = λ1 = · · · = λ.21 As a result,
the workers’ consumption-savings behavior is as if the elite-protecting environment were in
place forever. Moreover, also the oligarchs’ current consumption decisions are unaffected
by a possible future switch to λ: deriving income exclusively from capital, consumption by
oligarch i , (ρ/(1 + ρ)) (1 + r Et
)
kit , is just a function of the current capital stock and the
current rate of return. Thus, as long as λt = λ, all variables evolve as if λ were in place
forever. Relying on this insight, we can now prove the following result:
Proposition 7 Suppose that the elite has chosen λ0 = λ. Then, the politico-economic equi-
librium path entails a swtich to perfect enforcement (λ = 1) at some point t > 0 in the
future.
Proof See “Appendix”. 	unionsq
The driving force behind this change in policy preferences is the endogenous evolution of
the aggregate capital stock and its distribution. Intuitively, with the low level of enforcement
permanently in place, κ would grow arbitrarily close to λ—which means that the rents from
the price-manipulation effect slowly fade away. Similarly, as K̂t,λ approaches its steady-state
level, the benefits from the slowdown-effect diminish. Put differently, elite-protecting insti-
tutions influence the dynamics of the two state variables in a way that makes the rents lose
significance over time. Thus, at some point, it must become optimal to strengthen contract
enforcement in order to improve access to productivity-enhancing inputs.
For further use below, note also that the representative oligarch’s initial utility under invari-
ably weak enforcement (i.e., with λ0 = λ1 = · · · = λ) is just a lower bound of the level
associated with the politico-economic equilibrium path: as long as contract enforcement is
weak, the economy evolves exactly as if λ were in place forever. However, at the moment of
the improvement, the continuation value on the equilibrium path is strictly higher than the
continuation value associated with the invariably low λ.
Early institutions The ultimate step is now to discuss under which circumstances the elite
opts for λ0 = λ. To do so, suppose first that γ ≤ λ so that implementing λ does not result in a
productivity loss (B(λ)− B(λ) = 0). Then, by Proposition 4, implementing and indefinitely
preserving λ (i.e., λ0 = λ1 = · · · = λ) would lead to a discrete increase in the representa-
tive oligarch’s initial utility level (relative to perfect enforcement). As a result, this sequence
would continue to be welfare-improving if the productivity differential B(λ) − B(λ) were
sufficiently close to zero but not exactly zero (i.e., if γ were larger but sufficiently close to λ).
Thus, since the initial utility level associated with a constantly low λ is just a lower bound
of the equilibrium level, there must exist a sufficiently small productivity differential so that
λ0 = λ (in combination with “entry prohibited”) is the optimal choice by the elite.22
Section 5 goes through a number of simulations to address further interesting questions, in
particular regarding the impact of the initial conditions on early institutions and the size of the
welfare effects. Moreover, we will look at the timing of institutional change. The following
proposition summarizes our exposition so far (proof in the text):
Proposition 8 Consider an economy where capital is “scarce” (i.e., where K̂0,λ is below
the steady-state level). Then, on the politico-economic equilibrium path,




> λ for all t > 0 (Proposition 3) so that
Proposition 4 applies at each point on the equilibrium path.
22 In this context, it is also interesting to get a sense for the burden required to just prevent a worker from
acquiring a license at some point before the switch to λ. Relying on the baseline parametrization discussed in
Sect. 5, this critical burden would be 108% of the current GDP p.c. if λ = 0.2 (and 90% if, e.g., λ = 0.4).
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(i) the elite opts for λ0 = λ unless the associated productivity loss exceeds a certain
strictly positive level (whose relationship to the initial conditions is numerically ass-
essed in Sect. 5);
(ii) in case of λ0 = λ, the elite will switch to perfect enforcement (λ = 1) at some point
t > 0 in the future (for which Sect. 5 also provides an intuition).
Discussion Our results may deliver new insights into potential forces behind the high inci-
dence of distortionary institutions among less-advanced economies (see, e.g., Fig. 1). The
analysis suggests that, at early stages of development, the oligarchs have strong incentives to
push for prohibitive barriers to entry and weak contracting institutions—even if this combi-
nation came at a cost in terms of lower productivity. Intuitively, with capital still scarce in the
economy, elite-protecting institutions provide the elite with cheap access to credit—which
has a huge impact on the profitability of the elite-run firms. Moreover, by depressing the
workers’ incentives to save, the pace of aggregate capital accumulation is reduced so that
the return to accumulation declines less sharply over time—which benefits the major owners
of capital. So, if the elite is politically powerful, a country at the onset of the accumulation
process is likely to adopt such a combination of distortions. In more advanced economies,
however, the benefits from elite-protecting institutions become minor as a result of the evo-
lution of the capital stock and its distribution. What remains is just the “cost” in terms of
lower productivity due to limited access to other input factors. So while the model predicts
(oligarchic) regimes to favor elite-protecting institutions at early stages of development, these
governments may well favor more open structures after a few decades.
In reality, there are additional forces which contribute to such a pattern. For instance, as
discussed in Acemoglu (2008) or Caselli and Gennaioli (2006), entrepreneurial talent may be
imperfectly correlated across generations; hence, restricting business to the incumbents turns
increasingly costly. Similarly, as highlighted by Galor and Moav (2004, 2006), credit con-
straints become more and more of a burden if they prevent the average citizen from acquiring
education: with low human capital investments, the return to physical capital is bound to
decrease sharply over the process of development—which hurts the elite. On the other hand,
there are also forces which might delay institutional change. For instance, if maintaining an
efficient court system is costly and requires higher taxes (as, e.g., argued in Acemoglu and
Verdier (1998)), the net benefit from stronger enforcement is smaller—which means that
improving enforcement becomes optimal at an even later stage (see Sect. 5 below). More-
over, in the present set-up, removing the distortions leads to a decline in wealth inequality as
the economy approaches its steady state. Thus, if the oligarchs’ political clout rests on their
high relative wealth, they might prefer to maintain the elite-protecting environment to secure
political power (whose loss could be associated with higher taxes, for instance).
To conclude this section, we briefly review some historical accounts from Mexico’s Por-
firian era (1877–1911) which marks the start of the country’s process of development. At the
time, access to economic opportunities was highly unequal. Coatsworth (1978, p. 92), for
instance, reports that “public regulations of economic activity (…) raised start-up costs and
discouraged enterprise.” At the same time, creditors could not rely on the judiciary when
dealing with a defaulting debtor because, as Haber (1991, p. 567) reports, “it was extremely
difficult to enforce loan contracts [through courts].” Yet, weak enforcement was not the only
reason why an outsider was virtually unable to get a bank credit. In addition, the government
deliberately hampered entry into the banking sector by applying a restrictive licensing policy.
Apparently, the purpose behind these policies was to benefit a small number of economic
and political elites. On the one hand, as highlighted here, the combination of weak contract
enforcement and restrictive banking regulations suppressed incentive-compatible demand for
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credit by excluding those outside the elite from the banking system—and hence guaranteed
relatively cheap access to capital for a small number of well-established financiers/indus-
trialists who mainly invested the borrowed funds in their own enterprises. Maurer (2002,
Chap. 5) highlights that such profitable auto-préstamo (insider lending) was the standard
practice during the Porfirian era. On the other hand, in addition to winning crucial polit-
ical support from the oligarchs and securing financing for the government, the politicians
could appropriate part of the rents by receiving low-interest loans for their own industrial
endeavors (Haber et al. 2003, Chaps. 3, 4). Note, finally, that the country’s credit markets
remained under-developed during whole era: even after three decades of growth, aggregate
savings in the banking system were still small (Haber et al. 2003). During the same period,
however, the elite-run enterprises grew exceptionally large—even by US standards (Maurer
2002, Chap. 6). The model’s predictions are also consistent with these observations.23
5 Simulations
This section goes through a numerical exercise in order to highlight additional qualitative
properties of the model but also to look at the quantitative side. Specifically, Sect. 5.1 looks
at the welfare effects associated with elite-protecting institutions while Sect. 5.2 focuses on
the timing of institutional change. As for the quantitative implications, the goal is to provide
a sense of the magnitudes for reasonable parameter values and initial conditions.
5.1 Magnitude of the welfare implications
The focus here is on the welfare implications for the representative member of the elite.
To quantify these welfare effects, we ask—for different levels of λ—what deterioration in
the country’s production possibilities is required to offset the benefits associated with elite-
protecting institutions. More precisely, we compute the compensating downward shift of
the entire path of the productivity parameter B = Aα/(1−α) if elite-protecting institutions
were permanently introduced in t = 0.24 While this is an illustrative way to quantify utility
changes in real terms, the resulting numbers have also a clear interpretation in the context of
Proposition 8: they constitute a lower bound for the maximum productivity differential the
elite is prepared to accept in exchange for the introduction of elite-protecting institutions in
the beginning.
Parametrization Regarding the parametrization of the model, we take a period to represent
1 year and rely on α = 0.33, ρ = 0.04 and g = 0.025 so that the labor share is given by
two-thirds of the GDP and the steady-state rate of return is 6.6% p.a. Note that we do not
23 More recent evidence comes from fast-industrializing South Korea during the Park years (1961–1979). Also
in this case, the ruler had close ties with the elites (i.e., the cheabol-owners; Chang 2003) and the main tool
to please the elites was to deliver policies which provided them with cheap access to capital (Kang 2002a, b).
These low-interest loans were highly beneficial to the oligarchs: in the 1960s, they were prepared to pay up
to 20% of the loans in kickbacks. At the same time, the total amount of capital available in the banking sys-
tem remained only low—which again did not prevent the cheabols from growing exceptionally large. Major
reforms took place only in the 1980s when the system became too inefficient even for the elites. According
to Treisman (1995), Russia went through a similar experience in the early 1990s. Finally, Rose-Ackerman
(1999, pp. 10–11) reports analog practices from some of today’s least-advanced economies, notably Kenya
and Pakistan.
24 It is more convenient to express the shift in terms of the transformed productivity parameter B (rather than
in A) because the resulting numbers give at the same time the impact on the long-run output level.
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have to take a stand on the size of the elite, θ. Although this parameter affects the level of
utility, it cancels out in our comparative welfare analysis due to logarithmic current-period
utility. The baseline choices for the initial values of the state variables are as follows: the start
level of the aggregate capital stock, K̂0, is chosen to be 20 times below the steady-state level
so that the average growth rate of the GDP is roughly 10.9% p.a. in the first 10 years and then
4.2% and 3.2% in the second and the third decade, respectively. Regarding the distribution,
we assume the elite’s share in the initial capital stock, (1 − κ0), to be 0.8. We will, however,
perform additional simulations for different combinations of initial conditions.
Note that the choices for α and ρ represent values routinely used in growth theory. The
remaining numbers are chosen to broadly capture the situation in Porfirian Mexico (1877–
1911) which can be viewed as a model case for the present framework. Regarding annual
productivity growth, Razo and Haber (1998) report numbers in the range of 2–3%. Data from
Maddison (2007) implies further that the average yearly GDP per capita growth rate in the
third decade of the Porfirian era was approximately 3.2% (earlier data is scarce). Finally,
although there is hardly evidence on the initial distribution of capital, Haber (1989, Chap. 3)
suggests that (1−κ0) = 0.8 might be a reasonable choice (while, to mention it only for com-
pleteness, θ is estimated to be just 1% of the population).25 Given this parametrization, the
steady-state level of capital, K̂ ∗f b, is given by 11.04 while κ∗f b can be numerically computed
as 0.75.
Simulation results We assess the welfare implications for four different values of λ < κ∗f b,
namely for 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, and 0.2 (and illustrate the associated behavior of some of the
endogenous variables in Figs. 6, 7). Our findings are as follows: at the onset of the accumu-
lation process, a representative oligarch would accept a downward shift of the entire path of
productivity of at most 31% in order to have λ = 0.5 rather than perfect enforcement; in
order to have λ equal to 0.4 or 0.3, the elite would accept downward shifts of maximum 42
and 49%, respectively; finally, if λ = 0.2, the compensating shift would be 55%. Clearly,
these numbers suggest significant welfare implications: at early stages of development, the
price-manipulation effect and the slowdown effect may be so strong that the oligarchs prefer
to establish elite-protecting institutions even if they permanently slashed productivity and
hence long-run output by half. Moreover, as argued above, these numbers represent just lower
bounds if the elite is free to improve contract enforcement (and thus productivity) later on.
Note further that, in the present simulations, the impact of creditor protection is mono-
tonic. Lower levels of λ are consistently associated with “lower” trajectories of K̂ and κ (see
Fig. 6) but also with higher utility levels for the representative oligarch. So even though a
lower λ goes together with lower deposits and hence less scope for “cheap” external finance,
there is (in a broad range) a clear negative link between creditor protection and the elite’s
welfare.26 Thus the slowdown effect appears to be the dominant component in the overall
welfare effect.
Table 1 shows the corresponding numbers for different start values of K̂0 and κ0. The
basic picture is that the welfare implications are substantial in each of the reported situations.
Moreover, the table reveals two additional interesting patterns. First, the representative oli-
garch benefits stronger (i.e., is willing to accept even higher productivity losses in exchange
for elite-protecting institutions) if the initial aggregate capital stock is lower. The reason
25 Note: (i) Razo and Haber (1998) numbers refer to productivity growth in the textile industry; (ii) the GDP
p.c. growth rate for the third decade is based on Maddison (2007) entries for the years 1895 and 1904; (iii) the
elite’s share in aggregate capital is based on Haber’s (1989, Chap. 3) remark that the elite, representing 1% of
the population, owned the lion’s share of national wealth (see Table 1 for other plausible values).
26 Note further that a large number of additional simulations have not led to any signs of non-monotonicity.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 6 Dynamics of the aggregate capital stock and its distribution with different λs (for a constant path of
B)
(a) (b)
Fig. 7 Dynamics of the aggregate output and the rates of return with different λs (for a constant path of B)
is that, at a lower level of accumulation, the oligarchs face a longer period during which
they enjoy cheap access to highly productive capital. Second, the welfare gain increases in
the workers’ share in initial capital: with the elite owning less capital in relative terms, the
borrowing rate has to fall farther below the marginal product, particularly at early stages of
development. Thus, during this period, the rents per unit of capital borrowed are larger.
5.2 Endogenous institutional change
The aim of this final quantitative exercise is to provide an intuition for the length of the period
during which elite-protecting institutions endogenously persist. More specifically, given a
certain productivity-depressing impact of the elite-protecting environment, we determine the
moment the elite finds it optimal to switch to perfect enforcement.
We continue to rely on the parameter choices and initial conditions introduced above and,
for the most part, set λ equal to 0.2 (but briefly consider other values). Moreover, for conve-
nience, the simulations are performed under the assumption that the decision on institutions is
taken every 5 years, with the first decision in t = 0. On this basis, our simulations predict the
elite-protecting environment to persist for 55 years if the associated productivity differential
is 10% (as compared to the first-best world with λ = 1).27 The corresponding number is
27 Formally, a productivity differential of 10% means Bt (λ) = 0.9Bt (λ), whereas again Bt (λ) =
At (λ)α/(1−α).
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40 years in case of a productivity differential of 20%; for losses of both 30 and 40% we get a
period of 30 years; finally, if the differential were 50%, the oligarchs would find it optimal to
preserve elite-protecting institutions for two decades. Note further that these numbers are not
particularly sensitive to the specific choice of λ. For instance, with λ = 0.3 and a productivity
loss of 30%, the distortions would still persist for 30 years.
It is finally worth pointing out that these results only apply if improvements in contract
enforcement are costless. Otherwise, if stronger contracting institutions came at a cost (as
discussed in the previous section), the elite would switch at an even later stage. For the sake
of illustration, assume that strong contracting institutions require a permanent consumption
tax of 10% (while λt = λ is costless). Then, given a productivity differential of 30%, the
oligarchs would preserve the elite-protecting environment for 50 years.
In brief, relying on reasonable parameter choices, these final quantitative results again
reflect the significance of the price-manipulation and slowdown effects at early stages of
development: in exchange for cheap access to credit and a slower pace of aggregate accumu-
lation, the model predicts the elite to accept substantial productivity losses over considerable
periods of time.
6 Summary and conclusions
Economic institutions give often rise to substantial inequality in the access to economic oppor-
tunities, most notably in low-income countries. Incumbent producers tend to be protected
from outside competitors as a result of administrative barriers to entry or due to poor con-
tracting institutions which reduce the availability of credit (and other inputs) for prospective
entrepreneurs. This paper introduces such elite-protecting institutions into the infinite-hori-
zon framework in order to address two related sets of issues: first, how and through which
channels do these distortions affect economic development and the evolution of the wealth
distribution? Second, adopting a political-economy perspective, what can the consequences
of elite-protecting institutions teach us about their high incidence among poor countries?
We find the implications of such institutions to be especially rich in less-advanced econ-
omies. In particular, if capital is scarce, elite-protecting institutions exert a major impact
on the dynamics of the distribution. While a similar undistorted economy would grow more
equal over time, elite-protecting institutions ensure that the aggregate capital stock remains or
becomes even more concentrated in the hands of a tiny group. The reason is a price-manipu-
lation effect: the workers have to accept relatively low deposit rates and so save only little. To
the oligarchs, however, low deposit rates mean cheap access to credit and hence high profits.
As a result, they accumulate fast so that the wealth distribution gets polarized. Moreover, due
to the strong distortion of the workers’ savings incentives, the aggregate capital stock grows
at a lower rate. This slowdown effect is a second channel through which elite-protecting
institutions benefit the oligarchs: slower aggregate accumulation means a slower decline in
the marginal product of capital—which benefits the major capital owners.
There are, however, also negative consequences for the elite. In particular, weak contract
enforcement may limit the oligarchs’ access to other crucial inputs and thus impair produc-
tivity. Interestingly, magnitude and direction of the net effect crucially depend on the level
of development: at low levels, the beneficial effects outweigh even significant productivity
differentials. Yet, with capital no longer scarce, the positive effects weaken so that the net
effect turns negative at some point. Clearly, this shift in the cost-benefit ratio offers an expla-
nation for why weak contracting institutions (and costly regulation of entry) are mainly
adopted in less-advanced economies: at early stages of development, a powerful group has
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strong incentives to push for such distortions—which then prevent the economy from advanc-
ing quickly by depressing productivity and aggregate savings. It is only at more advanced
levels where all segments of society unanimously support strong contracting institutions.
The present analysis suggests that elite rule and capital scarcity are important forces
behind the emergence of financial suppression and complementary barriers to entry. A brief
survey of historical evidence from two well-studied countries—Mexico in the Porfirian era
(1877–1911) and South Korea during the Park years (1961–1979)—broadly supports the
mechanisms highlighted here. Yet, a more exhaustive analysis of institutional persistence
and change in oligarchies will be an essential and interesting topic for future research.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose first that κ never falls and never stays unchanged during the
transition towards the steady state. Then, the claim immediately follows.
Suppose now that κ decreases or remains constant at least once. By aggregating Eq. (11)
across oligarchs and remembering Eq. (13) we can calculate the oligarchs’ share in aggregate
consumption, C Et /Ct , as (1−κt )(1+rt )K̂t
(
(1 + rt )K̂t + Ĥt
)−1
. From the Euler equation we
know that this ratio does not change over time since—in the first-best economy—the rate of
return is the same for workers and oligarchs. In particular, C Et /Ct takes the same value in the
transition towards the steady state as in the steady state. Hence, using 1+r∗f b = (1+ρ)(1+g)
and Ĥ∗f b = (1 + ρ)ρ−1ŵ∗f b, we get
C Et
Ct
= (1 − κt ) (1 + rt )K̂t
(1 + rt )K̂t + Ĥt
= (1 − κ∗f b)γ, (A-1)
whereas γ ≡ αρ(1 + g)/ (ρ + g(1 + ρ − α)) .
Suppose now that κt+1 ≤ κt or, equivalently, that 1 − κt+1 ≥ 1 − κt . Then, since
(1 − κt+1) = (1 − κt ) (1 + rt )K̂t
(1 + rt )K̂t + (1 + ρ)ŵt − ρ Ĥt
,
we have (1 + ρ)ŵt − ρ Ĥt ≤ 0 or, equivalently, Ĥt ≥ (1 + ρ)ρ−1ŵt . Using this inequality
in Eq. (A-1) leaves us with
(1 − κt )δ(K̂t ) ≥ (1 − κ∗f b)γ,
whereas
δ(K̂t ) = 1 + α K̂
α−1
t
1 + α K̂ α−1t + (1 + ρ)ρ−1(1 − α)K̂ α−1t
.
Further, since Ĥ∗f b = (1 + ρ)ρ−1ŵ∗f b, δ(K̂ ∗f b) equals γ. Then, because δ′(K̂t ) > 0 for
K̂t < K̂ ∗f b, we have δ(K̂t ) < γ if K̂t < K̂ ∗f b. Hence,
(1 − κt ) > (1 − κ∗f b) or κ∗f b > κt .
Finally, assume that κ decreases (or remains constant) for the first time between τ ≥ 0 and
τ + 1. Then, κ∗f b > κτ ≥ κ0.
Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose first that Ĉ0 is strictly lower in the elite-protecting economy.
According to Eq. (13), this can only be true if Ĥ0 is strictly lower than in the first-best case.
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Then, since K̂0 is exogenous, K̂1 must be higher (Eq. 16). Accordingly, r L1 will be lower and
ŵ1 will be higher (both in a strict sense) than in the first-best economy. Since ŵ0 is the same
in both economies and r L1 is strictly lower with elite-protecting institutions, it follows from
Eq. (15) that Ĥ1 must be strictly lower (as compared to the first-best economy). Therefore,
we may infer that K̂2 is higher and, consequently, that r L2 (ŵ2) is lower (higher) than in the
first-best economy. Very similar to the step before, it must then be that Ĥ2 is strictly lower in
the elite-protecting economy. We may now repeat these arguments ad infinitum and conclude
that, under the premise made above, the capital stock in the elite-protecting economy must
be strictly higher at all future dates t > 0. Since a higher stock of capital is associated with
a lower workers’ rate of return and a higher wage rate, Ĥ0 must be strictly higher as well
(Eq. 14). But this contradicts our initial assumption.
Suppose now that Ĉ0 does not differ from the corresponding value in the first-best econ-
omy, implying that also Ĥ0 is the same in both situations. Suppose further that κ0 < λ. Then,
the two economies must evolve parallel until κ reaches λ. From Lemma 1 and the assumption
κ∗f b > λ we know that κ must cross the λ-threshold at some point. Suppose that this happens
for the first time in t = τ, i.e., κτ > λ and κt ≤ λ ∀t < τ. Again, it is important to note that
before τ both Ĥ and K̂ (as well as the workers’ rate of return and the wage rate) do not differ
from their first-best counterparts and this is even true for K̂τ . But since r Lτ is strictly lower
with elite-protecting institutions, Ĥ is (for the first time) strictly lower in the elite-protecting
economy in τ . We can now use the same arguments as in the first part of the proof in order
to end with the contradiction that Ĥ0 must be strictly higher in the elite-protecting economy.
In case of κ0 ≥ λ this second part of the proof can be carried out in a similar way.
Having led the assumption that Ĉ0 is smaller (or the same) to a contradiction, we infer that
Ĉ0 is strictly higher in the elite-protecting economy. This, in turn, implies that K̂1 is smaller.
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose that—contrary to what is stated in the proposition—there
exists a τ so that in τ + 1 the aggregate capital stock is for the first time strictly higher in
the elite-protecting economy than in the first-best case. More formally, assume that K̂τ+1
is strictly higher and that K̂t is lower or equal for all t ≤ τ. Then, r Lτ+1 must be strictly
smaller in the former case (Eq. 6). So, for K̂τ+1 to be strictly higher with elite-protecting
institutions, Ĥτ+1 must be strictly lower (Eq. 16′) such that, again, K̂τ+2 is strictly higher in
the elite-protecting economy (Eq. 16). This, in turn, implies that Ĥτ+2 is smaller which leads
to a higher K̂τ+3, and so on. Hence, from τ + 1 onwards, the the workers’ rate of return will
be strictly lower (as compared to first-best) and the wage rate will be strictly higher. But this
means that Ĥτ+1 must be strictly higher (Eq. 14)—which is a contradiction.
The assumption that the capital stocks are equal at some points in time can be led to a
contradiction in a similar way. Further, since the first-best economy monotonically converges
to K̂ ∗f b, we also have K̂t < K̂ ∗f b, t ≥ 0, in the elite-protecting economy.
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose first that κ0 < λ. By Lemma 2 and Eq. (13), both Ĉ0 and Ĥ0
must be strictly higher in the elite-protecting economy. Suppose now that κt ≤ λ for all t ≥ 0.
Then, along the lines of the proof of Lemma 2, it can be shown that K̂t will be smaller than in
the first-best economy at all dates t > 0. Consequently, for all t > 0, r Lt (wt ) must be strictly
higher (strictly lower) in the elite-protecting economy. But this translates into a smaller Ĥ0
(Eq. 14) which contradicts Lemma 2. Hence, κ must pass λ from below at some future date.
Suppose now that κ reaches (or falls below) λ from above at some date τ + 1. From Lemma
1 we know that κ∗f b(K̂τ , κτ ) > λ. Hence, by Lemma 2 and Eq. (13), both Ĉτ and Ĥτ must
be strictly higher than in a first-best economy that starts with K̂τ and κτ . Then, using the
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same arguments as above, κ must pass λ from below at some later date again. From this,
κ∗f b(K̂t , κt ) > λ, t > 0, immediately follows.
Proof of Lemma 3 To see that aggregate savings are strictly positive in t = 0, assume, to
the contrary, that K̂1 ≤ K̂0. Since K̂ E1 > K̂ E0 , we have K̂ L1 < K̂ L0 and therefore κ1 < κ0,
implying 1 + r L1 > 1 + r L0 ≥ 1 + r∗f b. Hence, due to the Euler equation, Ĉ L must rise
between the dates 0 and 1. Likewise, we have Ĉ E1 > Ĉ E0 and therefore Ĉ1 > Ĉ0. Then, by
Eq. (13), Ĥ1 > Ĥ0. Finally, it fallows from Eq. (16) that K̂2 < K̂1 ≤ K̂0. This sequence of
steps can be repeated to see that K̂ L will eventually reach zero. At that point, however, the
workers can no longer follow the Euler equation since they may not borrow. Because such a
path cannot be optimal, aggregate savings must be strictly positive in t = 0: K̂1 > K̂0.
Suppose now that K̂t > K̂t−1 and K̂t+1 ≤ K̂t with t > 0. Using the same arguments
as above, we have r Lt+1 > r Lt . Then, by Eq. (16′), Ĥt+1 > Ĥt . Further, Eq. (16) implies
that K̂t+2 < K̂t+1 ≤ K̂t . But then, r Lt+2 must be strictly higher than r Lt+1 and, according to
Eq. (15), Ĥ must rise again between t + 1 and t + 2 so that K̂t+3 < K̂t+2, and so on. Again,
such a path cannot be optimal, and we conclude that K̂t+1 > K̂t , t ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 6 By the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, the sequence {κt }t≥0 has a
convergent subsequence. We start the proof by showing that any convergent subsequence
of {κt }t≥0 has to converge to λ. Notice first that one can rule out that a subsequence con-
verges to a value on the interval (λ, 1] based on the same argumentation as in the text: the





j≥0 that converges to a value on the interval [0, λ), i.e., suppose without loss
of generality that lim
j→∞κt j = λ − ς with ς > 0. Then, there must be a η ∈ (0, ς) so that
there exists a j˜ with ∣∣λ − κt j
∣
∣ > η for all j ≥ j˜ . Consequently, by Proposition 3, we know
that κ has to increase infinitely often by an amount larger than η > 0 so that, since both
K̂ E and K̂ monotonically rise over time, K̂ must grow towards infinity. But this contradicts
Proposition 5. We conclude that any convergent subsequence of {κt }t≥0 converges to λ.
Suppose now that the sequence {κt }t≥0 does not converge to λ. Then, there must be a
ε > 0 so that for all t there exists a m(t) ≥ t with ∣∣λ − κm(t)
∣
∣ ≥ ε. Consider the sequence{
κm(t)
}
t≥0 . This sequence is also contained in the closed and bounded interval [0, 1], and
hence must have a convergent subsequence. This convergent subsequence, since it is also a





ε. Therefore, we have lim
t→∞κt = λ.
Solution to the decision problem in Sect. 4 The set of first-order conditions reads
(1 − γ )pt zγi t q−γi t − Rt − µ1t
(






































i t − χ zit
)
− Rt (qit − kit )
)






i t − ptχ zit
)
= 0,
with µ1t ≤ 0 and µ2t ≤ 0. A solution to this system includes the optimal values of the
two endogenous variables in each of the four possible sub-cases which are associated with
the relevance of the two restrictions in equilibrium (binding or not binding). Moreover,
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the solution states the conditions determining which of the four sub-cases is actually the
relevant one.
Suppose first that the credit-restriction is binding and assume for the moment the technol-
ogy restriction binds as well (Case µ1t < 0, µ2t < 0). Then, we get
A˜i t = A˜ = (λ/χ)γ/(1−γ ) and qit = (1 − (λpt A(λ)/Rt ))−1 kit ,
whereas A(λ) = A˜(1−λ). To determine the conditions under which this equilibrium is rele-
vant, multiply Eq. (A-2) by qit and Eq. (A-3) by zit and then add the two expressions together.
The result is pt A(λ)−Rt = µ1t (λpt A(λ) − Rt ) which immediately implies pt A(λ) > Rt >
λpt A(λ) since µ1t < 0. Further, Eq. (A-3) can only hold if λ < γ. Notice that the situation
with only the credit-restriction binding (Case µ1t < 0, µ2t = 0) is very similar. In particu-
lar, the expression for qit is unchanged, and we must also have pt A(λ) > Rt > λpt A(λ).
The difference is that we now get A˜i t = A˜ = (γ /χ)γ/(1−γ ) and hence A(λ) = A˜(1 − γ ).
Moreover, Eq. (A-3) can only be satisfied if λ ≥ γ.
Consider now the cases in which the credit-restriction is not binding (Cases µ1t = 0,
µ2t < 0 and µ1t = 0, µ2t = 0). A similar approach as above shows that these cases can only
be relevant if pt A(λ) = Rt . Moreover, we have again A˜i t = A˜ = (λ/χ)γ/(1−γ ) (and hence
A(λ) = A˜(1 − λ)) if λ < γ and A˜i t = A˜ = (γ /χ)γ/(1−γ ) (and hence A(λ) = A˜(1 − γ ) ) if
λ ≥ γ. Finally, qit can take any value on the interval [kit , (1 − λ)−1kit ].
Proof of Proposition 7 Note first that the sequences {Kt }t≥0 , {κt }t≥0 and {λt }t≥0—together
with the sequence of the workers’ belief about the future evolution of K , κ, and λ—con-
stitute a politico-economic equilibrium if, at each point in time, they are consistent with
(i) the aggregated individual consumption-savings behavior (which, in turn, is based on the
beliefs about the future evolution of the sequences in case of the workers) and (ii) the optimal
institutional choice by the elite.
We now start the proof by introducing some notation: we denote by K̂t,λ and κt,λ the values
of the two state variable as long as enforcement is weak. Then, relying on this notation (and
provided that indeed λt = λ), the representative oligarch’s capital stock in period t can be
written as (1−κt,λ)Kt,λ/(1−θ), where Kt,λ ≡ K̂t,λBt (λ). Thus, under these circumstances,
the oligarch’s end-of-period wealth is denoted by
at,λ ≡
(
1 + r E (K̂t,λ, κt,λ
))
(1 − κt,λ)Kt,λ/(1 − θ),
where the rate of return r E (K̂t,λ, κt,λ) is given in Eq. (7).
Remember now that, as long as the elite sticks with weak enforcement, the two state
variables behave as if λ were in place forever even if there is a switch to perfect enforcement
in the future. Hence, the dynamics of K̂t,λ and κt,λ continues to be given by Propositions 5
and 6, respectively. In particular, K̂t,λ and κt,λ converge to the steady state levels K̂ ∗f b and λ







(1 − λ)Kt,λ/(1 − θ). (A-4)
We now continue by showing that—given the paths of K̂t,λ, κt,λ and at,λ—switching to








(1 − κt,λ)Kt,λ/(1 − θ),
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which gives the representative oligarch’s wealth if, in a given period t , the elite switches from











⎠ (1 − λ)Kt,λ/(1 − θ). (A-5)
Looking at Eqs. (A-4) and (A-5) now reveals that a˜∗t,λ > a∗t,λ since Bt (λ)/Bt (λ) > 1. So
there must exist a τ such that a˜τ,λ > at,λ for all t ≥ τ. But this means that opting for λτ = λ
is welfare-improving from the perspective of the oligarchs: after the switch, the laws of the
first-best economy apply, and the economy converges to the (“higher”) balanced growth path
associated with Bt (λ). During this transition, the oligarchs’ wealth (denote it by at,λ) steadily
improves over a˜τ,λ. As a result, we have at,λ > at,λ for all t > τ. The final step is now to
see that an oligarch’s consumption level is proportional to his wealth – which implies that
switching to λ in τ leads to strictly higher consumption from this period onwards.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommer-
cial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original author(s) and source are credited.
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